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APPLICATION OF THE MANDATORY-PERMISSIVE
DICHOTOMY TO THE DUTY TO BARGAIN AND UNI-
LATERAL ACTION: A REVIEW AND REEVALUATION
Although it was determined at an early stage in the development of
modern labor legislation that labor and management should be required
to meet and engage in collective bargaining,' Congress has not indicated
the specific subjects the parties are required to consider in their nego-
tiations.2 Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act,3 part
of the original 1935 enactment, enunciates the employer's duty to
bargain only in general terms, stating: "It shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the represen-
tatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of [section 9(a)]." 4
In addition to retaining this provision, 5 the 1947 amendments to the Act
included a new provision, section 8(b) (3), which imposes a corre-
sponding duty to bargain upon labor organizations. 6 To clarify the ex-
tent of the obligation established in these two sections, Congress in
1947 also enacted section 8(d), which defines collective bargaining as
good faith negotiations over "wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment." 7 Nevertheless, interpretational difficulties have
remained with respect to the scope of the statutory phrase.
1. The theory behind this policy is that "free opportunity for negotiation with
accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may
bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not attempt
to compel." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
2. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was unable to afford much assistance
on this issue, since its authority to regulate such matters was not clearly established.
See Consumer's Research, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 57 (1936).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
4. Id. S 158 (a) (5). Section 9(a) refers to the election of, and exclusive representa-
tion by, the representatives chosen by a majority of the employees. Id. 5 159(a).
5. For a discussion of the history of section 8(a) (5), see Feinsinger, The National
Labor Relations Act and Collective Bargaining, 57 MiCH. L. REv. 807 (1959); Comment,
Employer's Statutory Duty to Bargain, 32 FoRDHAar L. REv. 557 (1964); Comment,
Employer's Duty to Bargain Under the National Labor Relations Act, 30 TENN. L.
REV. 543 (1963).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer,
provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of Section
9(a)."
7. Section 8(d) provides, in pertinent part:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of
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It is the purpose of this Note to review the efforts of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the federal courts to apply the
statutory duty to bargain to contract negotiations and to actions taken
unilaterally by one party without consulting the other. After an exam-
ination of the uncertainty and inequities engendered by the current ap-
proach, a more practical alternative will be proposed.
MANDATORY AND PERmIssIvE BARGAmG SUBJECTS
Three approaches have been taken by the NLRB in its attempts to
regulate collective bargaining. The first has been the establishment of
collective bargaining procedures, with particular emphasis on the con-
cept of bargaining in "good faith." 8 The second has been to prescribe
the subjects upon which an employer must bargain at the request of
a union.9 Under this approach management's refusal to bargain upon
any single subject covered by the statutory phrase "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment" (a mandatory subject) has
been treated as an unfair labor practice, even where the negotiations
have encompassed a wide range of topics.'0 The third approach has
been to interpret one party's insistence upon a contract clause outside
the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith vith respect to 'wages, hours, and other
terns and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement,
or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession ....
Id. § 158(d) (emphasis supplied).
8. "Good faith" bargaining generally involves a test of the employer's subjective
state of mind. In recent years, however, the Board has applied the doctrine without
regard to the state of mind test. See, e.g., Truitt Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 856 (1954),
enforcement denied, 224 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1955), reVd, 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (refusal
to furnish financial information while claiming inability to raise wages); Textile Workers
Union (Personal Products), 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954), enforced in part, 227 F.2d 409
(D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 864 (1956) (engaging in short work stoppages
during negotiations); UMW Union, 117 NL.R.B. 1095 (1957), set aside, 257 F.2d 211
(D.C. Cir. 1958) (implementing a strike to resolve a grievance in violation of. an ar-
bitration clause). See also Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HAnv. L. REv.
1401 (1958).
9. This doctrine came into prominence through decisions dealing with health and
welfare, and pension funds. See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
10. For a discussion of this approach, see Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective
Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HAnv. L. REV. 389 (1950).
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the statutory phrase (a permissive subject) as a violation of section
8(a) (5) or section 8(b) (3). 11
In 1958 the Supreme Court adopted the Board's distinction between
mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects in NLRB v. Wooster
Division of Borg-Warner Corp.12 The employer had insisted through-
out negotiations upon the inclusion of tvo clauses: a limitation speci-
fying that the contract was between the company and the UAV local,
rather than the international union; and a prohibition against all strikes
unless a majority of all bargaining unit employees voted by secret
ballot to reject the employer's last offer. Rejecting the company's good
faith defense, the Board found that insistence upon either clause con-
stituted a per se violation of section 8(a) (5). 13
The Supreme Court adopted the Board's approach, holding that in-
sistence upon a nonmandatory clause constitutes a refusal to bargain
regardless of either party's good faith. Reading together sections
8(a) (5)14 and 8(d), the Court observed:
These provisions establish the obligation of the employer and the
representative of its employees to bargain with each other in
good faith with respect to "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment. . . ." The duty is limited to those
subjects, and within that area neither party is legally obligated
to yield .... As to other matters, however, each party is free
to bargain or not to bargain, and to agree or not to agree. 15
11. Dalton Tel. Co, 82 N.L.R.B. 1001 (1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1951).
See also Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 213 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1954); International
Bhd. of Teamsters (Conway's Express), 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949), enforced, 195 F.2d
906 (2d Cir. 1952).
12. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
13. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 1288 (1955).
14. The same reasoning is applicable to section 8(b) (3).
15. 356 U.S. at 349. The only subjects to which the parties are not free to agree
are those classified as "illegal." It is well settled that an illegal, as distinguished from
permissive, subject cannot be included in a collective bargaining agreement notwith-
standing mutual approval of. the parties. Honolulu Star Bulletin, Ltd., 123 N.L.R.B. 395,
enforcement denied on other grounds, 274 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Illegal subjects
are those which specifically violate the National Labor Relations Act. Among the
most prominent are closed shop clauses, which violate sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2),
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (3), (b) (2) (1970). American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v.
NLRB, 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951), enforcing in part 86 N.L.R.B. 951 (1949). But see
Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961) (a nondiscriminatory hiring hall is
not illegal as a closed shop). Also illegal are hot cargo clauses prohibited by section
8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970). Lithographers Local 17, 130 N..R.B. 985 (1961). See also
Lithographers Local 78, 130 N.L.R.B. 968 (1961). It should be noted, however, that a pro-
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The Court reasoned that, since the union was not required to bargain
over permissive subjects, the company should not be permitted to con-
dition an agreement with respect to mandatory subjects upon the in-
clusion of clauses covering permissive subjects. Thus, insistence by one
party upon a permissive subject was held to constitute a refusal to bar-
gain over all mandatory subjects,' 6 and a violation of section 8(a) (5)
or section 8(b) (3). 17
The "secret ballot" clause in Borg-Warner was held to be non-
viso to section 8(e) specifically excludes the construction and apparel and clothing indus-
tries from the section's prohibition. The Act also specifically prohibits "featherbedding"
clauses. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (6) (1970). The courts have interpreted this section strictly,
however, holding it to be applicable only in cases where work is not actually per-
formed. Therefore, if the clause requires actual work, regardless of the value of that
work to the employer, it is not an illegal subject. American Newspaper Publishers
Ass'n v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100 (1953), affirming in part 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951).
Finally, the parties may not agree to limit the exclusive bargaining authority of the
union. Bethlehem Steel Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 341 (1950).
Subjects may also be illegal as violative of federal antitrust statutes. See United Mine
Vorkers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co.,
381 U.S. 676 (1965). Although the applicability of other federal statutes has not been
finally determined by the Board or the courts, the Board has required parties to bargain
over practices which were arguably in violation of the federal income tax laws (Eve-
ning News Publishing Co, 196 N.L.R.B. 530 (1972)) and the government's economic
stabilization regulations for wage-price controls (Servis Equip. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No.
47 (1972); see Washington Employers, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 117 (1973) (failure to
implement wage increase in violation of 5.5 percent Phase II guidelines was a violation
of section 8(a) (5))).
The applicability of state law in determining the legality of bargaining subjects
remains unsettled due to federal preemption in questions of labor law. See generally
Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959); Steelworkers Local 1402 (Midland
Ross Corp., Capitol Foundry Div.), 199 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (1972) (Board found no
violation of section 8(b) (3) where the union insisted upon the inclusion of an "agency
shop" clause, which was illegal under the applicable Arizona law).
16. The Supreme Court stated:
[Glood faith does not license the employer to refuse to enter into agree-
ments on the ground that they do not include some proposal which is not
a mandatory subject of bargaiinng.... [Sluch conduct is, in substance,
a refusal to bargain about the subjects that are within the scope of man-
datory bargaining. This does not mean that bargaining is to be confined to
the statutory subjects. Each of the two controversial clauses is lawful in
itself. Each would be enforceable if agreed to by the unions. But it does
not follow that, because the company may propose these clauses, it can
lawfully insist upon them as a condition to any agreement.
356 U.S. at 349.
17. For a detailed discussion of Borg-Warner, see Note, The Impact of the Borg-
Varner Case on Collective Bargaining, 43 MiNT. L. REv. 1225 (1959); 11 STAN. L. Rzv.
188 (1958).
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mandatory on the ground that, unlike the normal no-strike clause
which "regulates the relations between the employer and the employees,"
this provision dealt "only with relations between the employees and
their unions . ," 15 The Court suggested that the proposed clause
would result in the weakening of "the independence of the 'represen-
tative' chosen by the employees," '19 in effect permitting the employer
to deal directly with its employees instead of their statutory repre-
sentative, and therefore did not deal with "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment." The "recognition" clause was
also denominated a permissive subject, the Court viewing the employer's
insistence that the certified representative not be a party to the con-
tract as an evasion of the duty to bargain.
In summary, several principles may be extracted with respect to the
Borg-Warner dichotomy. A party is compelled by statute to bargain
only over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment;
these are mandatory subjects and a refusal to negotiate as to them, even
absent a showing of bad faith, is violative of the Act. Since neither
party is required by section 8(d) to make concessions, however, there
is no proscription against good faith insistence 0 to the point of impasse
on mandatory subjects. Conversely, although the parties may bargain
over a permissive clause if they so desire, adamant insistence upon such
a clause constitutes a per se violation of the Act.21 Finally, it should
be noted that an agreement by one party to bargain over a permissive
subject does not constitute a waiver of its right to insist that the subject
not be included in the final agreement.22 Regardless of the length of
the bargaining, a permissive subject never becomes a mandatory sub-
jct. 2 1
The following discussion will explore the difficulties encountered in
applying these general principles to specific collective bargaining sub-
jects in two distinct contexts-the duty to bargain during contract nego-
18. 356 U.S. at 350.
19. Id.
20. "Insistence" in the context of. collective bargaining means positing the subject
matter as a precondition to the negotiation of an agreement or as an ultimatum. See
Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
888 (1964) (proposed superseniority provision); cf. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,
373 U.S. 221 (1963).
21. 356 U.S. at 349.
22. Kit Mfg. Co., 150 NJ..RB. 662 (1964), enforced, 365 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1966).
23. It has been observed:
A determination that a subject which is non-mandatory at the outset may
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tiations and the right of an employer to act unilaterally to implement
management decisions. Although separate consideration will be given
to those subjects classified as wages, as hours, and as other terms and
conditions of employment, it should be noted that the statutory cate-
gories are not mutually exclusive; certain subjects, such as paid sick
leave, paid holidays, and paid vacation, may fall within any of the
three classifications.
Duty to Bargain During Contract Negotiations
The wage category has been afforded a broad construction by the
Board and the courts. There is apparently little doubt that basic
hourly rates of pay,24 piece rates and incentive plans2 5 overtime pay,26
shift differentials,27 paid holidays,2S paid vacations,29 and severance pay °
are mandatory subjects of bargaining. In addition, profit-sharing plans,8'
stock purchase plans,82 and merit wage increases" have been held to
become mandatory merely because a party had exercised this freedom
[to bargain or refuse to bargain] by not rejecting the proposal at once,
or sufficiently early, might unduly discourage free bargaining on non-manda-
tory matters. Parties might feel compelled to reject non-mandatory pro-
posals out of hand to avoid risking waiver of the right to reject it.
NLRB v. Davison, 318 F.2d 550, 558 (4th Cir. 1963).
24. Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 953 (1958); Phelps Dodge
Copper Prods. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952); Betty Brooks Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1237
(1952).
25. NLRB v. East Texas Steel Casting Co., 211 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1954); Moore of
Bedford, Inc., 187 N.L.R.B. 721 (1971); Tex-Tan Welhausen Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 851
(1968); C&S Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966); Honolulu Star Bulletin, Inc., 153
N.L.R.B. 763 (1965); Staub Cleaners Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 278 (1964); Skyway Luggage Co.,
117 N.L.R.B. 681 (1957); Central Metallic Casket Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 572 (1950).
26. NLRB v. Moench Tanning Co., 121 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1941); Braswell Motor
Freight Lines, Inc., 141 N.L.R.B. 1154 (1963).
27. Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1964).
28. Singer Mfg. Co., 24 N.L.R.B. 444 (1940), enforced, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.),
cc-n. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941).
29. Id.
30. NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963), vacated, 379 U.S. 644
(1965), on renzand, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
31. Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Black-Clawson Co.,
210 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1954); Dickten & Masch Mfg. Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 112 (1960).
32. B.F. Goodrich Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 914 (1972); Richfield Oil Corp., 110 N.L.R.B.
356 (1954), enforced, 231 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 909 (1956). See
also 43 GEo. L.J. 309 (1955); 69 HaRv. L. REv. 1511 (1956).
33. The rationale for holding merit increases to be a mandatory subject has been
explained as follows:
Merit pay where there are a number of employees means more than a
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constitute a form of compensation and hence to be within the statutory
phrase.
The question of Christmas bonuses presents a more difficult classi-
fication problem, since these may be considered either gifts or wages.
In NLRB v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co.,34 the first case to confront this
issue, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit viewed a bonus as
compensation and ordered the employer to bargain2.3 The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, has held on the basis of three
criteria that a bonus was a gift. 6 The factors considered by the court
-consistency of the practice, uniformity of the amount, and depend-
ency of payment upon the employer's financial condition-have re-
ceived general acceptance as the test for classifying a bonus as wage
or gifta7 If the bonus is a wage, it is a mandatory bargaining
gratuity or bonus paid to an occasional employee whom the company wishes
to favor on account of his loyalty or efficiency. It means necessarily the
formulation and application of standards; and such standards are proper
subjects of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining with respect to
wages might well be disrupted or become a mere empty form if the control
over the wages of individual employees were thus removed from the bar-
gaining area.
NLRB v. Berkley Mach. Works & Foundry Co., 189 F.2d 904, 907 (4th Cir. 1951).
See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1958);
Armstrong Cork Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1954); Weston & Brooker Co.,
154 N.L.R.B. 747 (1965); Midwestern Instruments, Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1961); J.H.
Allison & Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 377 (1946), enforced, 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 814 (1948).
34. 199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952).
35. The court reasoned:
It does, of course, merely beg the question to call . . . [the bonuses]
"gifts" and to argue, however persuasively, that gifts per se are not a re-
quired subject for collective bargaining. But if these gifts were so tied to
the remuneration which employees received for their work that they were
in fact a part of it, they were in reality wages and so within the statute....
Where, as here, the so-called gifts have been made over a substantial period
of time and in amount have been based on the respective wages earned by
the recipients, the Board was free to treat them as bonuses not economically
different from other special kinds of remuneration like pensions, retirement
plans or group insurance, to name but a few, which have been held within
the scope of the statutory bargaining requirement.
Id. at 714.
36. NLRB v. Wonder State Mfg. Co, 344 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1965).
37. See, e.g., John Zink Co., 196 N.L.RB. 942 (1972); NLRB v. United States Air
Conditioning Corp., 336 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Citizens Hotel Co., 326
F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Electric Steam Radiator Corp., 321 F.2d 733 (6th
Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Toffenetti Restaurant Co., 311 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1962); NLRB v.
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subject; if it is a gift, negotiations regarding it are permissive.3 8
In Inland Steel Co. 3 9 the Board first held that pension benefits for
present employees are wages and hence mandatory bargaining subjects.40
Subsequently, the Board and courts have consistently maintained that
retirement income plans41 and group health insurance plans42 are within
the statutory phrase. In Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co.,41 however, the Supreme Court, reversing a Board rul-
ing,"' held that bargaining over a pension plan for retired employees is
permissive since retirees are not "employees" within the meaning of the
Act.' As a result of the Pittsburgh Plate Glass decision, it is likely that
Wheeling Pipe Line, Inc., 229 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1956); cf. K-D Mfg. Co., 169 NL.RB.
51 (1968).
38. There is a question whether a union may be estopped from demanding bar-
gaining over Christmas bonuses as a result of its inaction over a number of years. See
General Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1964) (no estoppel after 35 years);
Comment, Unilateral Discontinuance of Christmas Gifts by Management, 6 SANTA CLARA.
LAw. 79 (1965).
39. 77 N.LRB. 1, enforced, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
960 (1949). See also Note, Proper Subjects for Collective Bargaining: Ad Hoc v. Pre-
dictive Definition, 58 YAE LJ. 803 (1949); Note, Pension and Retirement Matters-A
Subject of Compulsory Collective Bargaining, 43 ILL. L. REv. 713 (1948).
40. The Board rejected the company's argument that pension benefits are not wages,
stating:
With due regard for the aims and purposes of the Act and the evils
which it sought to correct, we are convinced and find that the term
"wages" as used in Section 9 (a) must be construed to include emoluments
of value, like pension and insurance benefits, which may accrue to employees
out of their employment relationship. There is indeed an inseparable nexus
between an employee's current compensation and his future pension bene-
fits.. .. In substance, therefore, the respondents monetary contribution
to the pension plan constitutes an economic enhancement of the employee's
money wages....
Realistically viewed, this type of wage enhancement or increase, no less
than any other, becomes an integral part of the entire wage structure, and
the character of the employee representative's interest in it, and the terms
of its grant, is no different than in any other case where a change in the
wage structure is effected.
77 N.L.R.B. at 4-5.
41. T.I.P. Corp., 190 NL..R.B. 240 (1971).
42. W.WV,. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949); General Motors Corp,
81 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949).
43. 404 U.S. 157 (1971), noted in 1971-72 Annual Survey of Labor Law 13 B.C.
INn. & Conm. L. REv. 1347, 1405-08 (1972); Comment, Collective Bargaining: Insistence,
But Only to a Point, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 365 (1973); 20 KAN. L. REV. 801 (1972); 39
U. CIN. L. REv. 573 (1970); 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 807 (1972).
44. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, 177 N.L.R.B. 911 (1969).
45. Section 2(3) of the Act provides, in pertinent part: "The term 'employee' shall
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all subjects dealing with postemployment remuneration will be con-
sidered mandatory as to present employees only.
The status of company housing and company-provided meals has been
the subject of continuing litigation. The general rule applied by the
Board is that living accommodations provided by an employer are both
"wages" and "conditions of employment" if they form an integral part
of the employment relationship.4 6 In addition, the Board has found
the issue of whether a company should provide meals for employees to
be within the statutory phrase.47 Although the Board has viewed the
price of food served by the company as a mandatory subject, this po-
sition has been repudiated by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.48 There also appears to be a distinction between food served
by the company and that provided by vending machines owned by an
independent contractor.4 9
The statutory obligation to bargain over "hours of employment" has
caused little interpretational difficulty. In the few cases involving this
issue, the Board has maintained its position that any addition, subtrac-
tion, or rearrangement of working hours by the employer constitutes
a mandatory bargaining subject.5 0
include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular em-
ployer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor
dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantially equivalent employment ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
46. See Hart Cotton Mills, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 728 (1950), enforced, 190 F.2d 964
(4th Cir. 1951); Elgin Standard Brick Mfg. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1467 (1950). But see NLRB
v. Benis Bros. Bag Co, 206 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1953) (company housing not a mandatory
subject due to lack of advantage to employees in rent arrangement). The Board has also
held that discrimination in providing company housing may violate section 8(a) (3),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970). See, e.g., W.T. Carter & Bros., 90 NL.R.B. 2020 (1950);
Abbott Worsted Mills, Inc., 36 N.L.R.B. 545 (1941), enforced, 127 F.2d 438 (1st
Cir. 1942).
47. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949). See also Herman Sausage
Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 168 (1958), enforced, 275 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1960) (section 8(a) (5)
violated where the employer unilaterally discontinued a meal allowance).
48. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1966), enforcement denied, 387
F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1967).
49. In McCall Corp. v. NLRB, 432 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1970), the court, reversing a
decision of the Board, held that the price of food served by an independent contractor
from vending machines was not a mandatory subject, especially where other sources of
food were available. See also 1970-71 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 12 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REv. 1026 (1971).
50. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946), enforcement denied on
other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947). But see Massey Gin & Mach. Works, Inc,
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The category "other terms and conditions of employment," on the
other hand, has presented great difficulty, both in its interpretation and
in its application. Nevertheless, a number of bargaining subjects ob-
viously fall within the statutory phrase, including vacations,51 holidays,52
sick leave, 53 work rules,54 union use of bulletin boards 5 changes in
method of payment," bargaining unit work by supervisors,57 physical
examinations of employees,58 duration of the collective agreement,5 9
grievance procedures,60 arbitration,"' layoffs," discharge,63 and work-
78 N.L.R.B. 189 (1948), enforcement denied per curiam, 173 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1949)
(employer's failure to notify union of changes in hours mitigated by subsequent nego-
tiation with union and by ambiguous contract provision).
51. Great S. Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 127 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1942).
52. NLRB v. Sharon Hats, Inc., 289 F.2d 628 (5th Cir. 1961); Instrument Div., Rock-
well Register Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 634 (1963); Leiter Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 843 (1955).
53. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
54. Murphy Diesel Co. v. NLRB, 454 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1971) (employer violated
section 8(a) (5) by unilateral implementation of rules on absenteeism and tardiness);
NLRB v. Southern Transp., Inc., 343 F.2d 558 (8th Cir. 1965); Tower Hosiery Mills,
Inc., 81 N.L.R.B. 658 (1949). In NLRB v. Communications Workers Local 1170
(Rochester Tel. Corp.), 474 F.2d 778 (2d Ci. 1972), the union was held to have
violated section 8(b) (3) by refusing to accept temporary supervisory assignments in
derogation of a "letter agreement."
55. NLRB v. Proof Co., 242 F.2d 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 US. 831 (1957).
56. General Motors Corp., 59 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1944) (change of payment from salary
base to hourly base).
57. Crown Coach Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 625 (1965).
58. LeRoy Mach. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964); cf. Wilburn v. Missouri-Kansas-
Texas R.R., 268 S.V.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (physical examinations a subject of
bargaining under the Railway Labor Act).
59. NLRB v. Yutana Barge Lines, Inc., 315 F.2d 524, 528 (9th Cir. 1963); United
States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1962). Although the ques-
tion of contract retroactivity is also a mandatory subject of bargaining (Bergen Point
Iron Works, 79 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1948)), a requirement of employee ratification of a
contract is not. NLRB v. Darlington Veneer Co., 236 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1956) (com-
pany insistence upon secret ratification vote of employees held an unfair labor practice);
cf. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); North
Country Mlotors, Ltd., 146 N.L.R.B. 671 (1964).
60. Crown Coach Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 625 (1965); Bethlehem Steel Co., 136 N.L.R.B.
1500 (1962), enforcement denied on other grounds, 320 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963);
Cranston Print Works Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 537 (1956).
61. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943); United States
Gypsum Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 112 (1951), enforced in part, 206 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1953).
62. Hilton Mobile Homes, 155 N.L.R.B. 873 (1965), enforced in part, 387 F.2d 7 (8th
Cir. 1967). See also Lasko Metal Prods., Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 976 (1964), enforced, 363
F.2d 529 (6th Cir. 1966).
63. See National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940); NLRB v. Bachelder,
120 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1941).
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loads. 64 Among those subjects held to be clearly outside the statutory
phrase, and thus permissive subjects, are the definition of the bargaining
unit where the Board has not yet defined the unit 65 or where the parties
wish to negotiate a unit different from that certified by the Board,6
the participation in negotiations either of persons excluded from the
coverage of the Act 67 or of additional parties other than the employer
and the employees' certified representative, 8 and the posting of a per-
formance bond to ensure fulfillment of the terms of the agreement. 69
Controversy has developed recently over union demands that nego-
tiation of collective bargaining agreements be conducted on a company-
wide basis, rather than according to established bargaining units. In
AFL-CIO Joint Negotiating Committee for Phelps Dodge0 the Board
held such a demand, and a resulting strike, to be in violation of section
8(b) (3). Upon appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that, although the various unions had never abandoned
their overall objective of negotiating a company-wide labor agreement,
all their demands at the different company locations were mandatory
subjects over which they were free to bargain to impasse.71
64. Irvington Motors, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 565 (1964), enforced, 343 F.2d 759 (3d
Cir. 1965) (fixing of sales quotas a mandatory subject of bargaining); Little Rock
Downtowner, Inc., 145 NL.R.B. 1286 (1964), aff'd as modified, 341 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir.
1965); Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 953 (1958).
65. Radio Corp. of America, 135 N.L.R.B. 980 (1962); General Motors Corp., 120
N.L.R.B. 1215 (1958).
66. Douds v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 241 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1957).
67. See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 648 (Safeway Co.), 203 F.2d 165 (9th
Cir. 1953) (supervisors); Southern Cal. Pipe Trades Dist. Council 16, 167 N.L.R.B.
1004 (1967) (supervisors); District 50, UMW (Central Soya Co.), 142 N.L.R.B. 930
(1963) (agricultural employees).
68. NLRB v. Taormina Co., 207 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1953), enforcing 94 N.L.R.B. 884
(1951); Standard Generator Serv. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 790 (1950), enforced, 186 F.2d
606 (8th Cir. 1951). Examples of such additional parties include the international
where only the local union is certified, the local where only the international is cer-
tified, and the employer where the unit is an employer association.
69. NLRB v. F.M. Reeves Sons, Inc., 47 L.R.R.M. 2480 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 914 (1961); Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cit. 1952); Newberry Equip.
Co, 135 N.L.R.B. 747 (1962); Teamsters Local 294 (Conway's Express), 87 N.L.R.B.
972 (1949), enforced, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952).
A number of additional subjects have been classified as permissive. See, e.g., NLRB
v. Carpenters Local 964, 447 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1971) (demand to withdraw unfair
labor practice charges and other pending litigation); Kit Mfg. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 662
(1964), enforced, 365 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1966) (union label); Carpenters Local 2265, 136
N.L.R.B. 769 (1962), enforced, 317 F.2d 269 (6th Cit. 1963) (industry promotion fund).
70. 184 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (1970), enforcement denied, 459 F.2d 374 (3d Cit. 1972).
71. AFL-CIO Joint Negotiating Comm. for Phelps Dodge v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 374
(3d Cir. 1972).
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The various forms of union security agreements have generally been
viewed as mandatory subjects within the meaning of "other terms and
conditions of employment." As early as 1949 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit ruled that union security was a subject of required
bargaining.72 It has also been held that proposals for agency shop
agreements 3 and nondiscriminatory union hiring halls74 are mandatory
bargaining subjects.
Perhaps the best examples of those subjects which are not "terms or
conditions of employment" are internal union matters. The Supreme
Court established in Borg-Warner that bargaining subjects dealing with
the employer-employee relationship are mandatory subjects, while those
affecting the relationship between employees and their union are per-
missive.71 Thus, an employer may not insist upon a clause requiring a
prestrike vote or employee ratification as a condition precedent to the
execution of a final agreement. 6 Similarly, the courts have refused to
72. NLRB v. Andrew Jergens Co., 175 F.2d 130 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
827 (1949); ef. Vanderbilt Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 297 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961) (insistence
upon an open shop held to constitute bad faith bargaining).
In Steelworkers Union v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 581
(1966), on remnand sub non. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
rcv'd on otber grounds, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), a section 8(a)(5) violation was found in
the employer's consistent refusal of the union's demand for checkoff of dues. See also
NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Reed & Prince
Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953). Since union shop and
dues checkoff are creatures of contract, however, there is no violation of the Act
where the employer unilaterally ceases to effectuate such measures upon the expiration
of the collective bargaining agreement. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers Union v. NLRB,
320 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963).
73. General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 303 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 373 US.
734 (1963). An "agency shop" clause requires an employee to pay the union an
amount equivalent to union dues, even though he is not required to join the union.
74. Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors, 143 N.L.RJ3. 409 (1963), enforced,
349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966); accord, NLRB v. Tom
Joyce Floors, Inc., 353 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1965); Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365
U.S. 667 (1961) (establishing the legality of union hiring halls); cf. Marine Cooks
Union, 90 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1950) (dismissing section 8(b) (3) charges against a union
for striking to obtain a hiring hall agreement).
75. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
76. Id. See also Houchens Mkt., Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1967),
enforcing 155 N.L.R.B. 729 (1965). For pre-Borg-Warner cases, see Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 213 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1954); United States Gypsum Co., 109
N.L.R.B. 1402 (1954). See also Note, Strike Vote Clauses: Bargainable Matter?, 44
GEo. L.J. 120 (1955).
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impose upon unions a duty to bargain over internal discipline practices77
or the makeup of union negotiating teams. 78
Somewhat different treatment has been afforded matters traditionally
within the control of management. The question usually arises when
an employer insists upon the inclusion in the collective bargaining agree-
ment of a broad management-rights clause, specifying the areas of con-
trol and decision reserved to management.7 9 The greater the number of
subjects stated to be within the unilateral control of management, the
broader the clause is said to be.
In NLRB v. American National Insurance Co.80 the Supreme Court
stated the general rule that a management-rights clause covering man-
datory subjects is itself a "condition of employment." Hence, insistence
upon inclusion of such a clause is not a per se violation of the Act. In
American National it was held that the Board, rather than passing upon
the desirability of the agreement's substantive terms, must base its de-
cision upon the good faith requirements of section 8 (d). Thus, although
there is no per se violation, an employer may make such extreme demands
with respect to the breadth of coverage of the clause that a finding of
bad faith is justified.8'
77. U.O.P. Norplex Div. of Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 155 (7th
Cir. 1971) (overruling Allen Bradley Co. v. NLRB, 286 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1961)). In
Universal Oil the court found the employer in violation of section 8(b) (5) when it in-
sisted to the point of impasse that the union withdraw fines previously imposed for vio-
lation of the union rule prohibiting the crossing of picket lines during a strike. The court
relied upon the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 US.
175 (1967).
78. Racine Die Casting Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 529 (1971).
79. A typical management-rights clause is as follows:
The Management of the Company and direction of its working forces
including, but not limited to the right to hire, suspend, or discharge for
proper cause, and the right to relieve employees from duty because of lack of
work or for other legitimate reasons, and the products to be manufactured,
the location of plants, the schedules of production, the methods, processes
and means of manufacturing, are solely and exclusively the rights and pre-
rogative of the Company provided, however, that this will not be used for
the purpose of discrimination against any member of the Union and ex-
cepting as these rights and prerogatives may be affected by any of the
provisions of this Agreement.
R. KN-EE & R. KNEE, CoL.acrxvE BARGAINING Ct.Ausns 69 (1967).
80. 343 U.S. 395 (1952). See Long Lake Lumber Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 435 (1970); Old
Line Life Ins. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 499 (1951); Standard Generator Serv. Co., 90 N.L.R.B.
790 (1950), aff'd, 186 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1951); Franklin Hosiery Mills, Inc., 83 N.L.R.B.
276 (1949).
81. Stuart Radiator Core Mfg. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 125 (1968); Vanderbilt Prods. Inc.,
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Most disputes between management and labor are resolved during
the process of negotiating the collective agreement. Even disputes
which arise during the term of the contract may be dealt with pro-
spectively by including within the agreement a provision either re-
serving control over an issue to management or requiring arbitration.
Nevertheless, where the parties fail to include a management-rights
clause or an arbitration provision, or where a dispute arises over an
issue which is not covered by such provisions, a determination must be
made concerning management's right to take action without first con-
sulting the union.
Unilateral Action 2
The unilateral action sphere is, in many ways, not far removed from
the foregoing discussion of bargaining subjects. The phrase "unilateral
act" connotes an action taken by an employer without consultation
with the representative of its employees and outside the context of
contract negotiations. Thus, the issue presented here is whether an
employer's section 8(a) (5) duty to bargain extends to matters other
than the content of the collective agreement."
The landmark case in the application of the mandatory-permissive
dichotomy to unilateral actions of employers is NLRB v. Katz,8 in which
the Supreme Court held that, as a general rule, an employer's unilateral
change in terms or conditions of employment, which are mandatory
bargaining subjects,"5 constitutes a refusal to bargain in violation of
129 N.L.R.B. 1323, enforced, 297 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961) (employer demands for
control were so extreme that no "self-respecting" union could accept them). See also
Chevron Oil Co., 182 N.L.RJ3. 445 (1970); Dixie Corp., 105 NL.R.B. 390 (1953).
82. For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see Collins, Unilateral Change in
Tcrms and Conditions of Employment at Contract Termination, 17 N.Y.U. CoNF.
LAB. 149 (1964); Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HAav. L. REv. 1401,
1423-24 (1958); Feinsinger, The National Labor Relations Act and Collective Bar-
gaining, 57 Mic. L. REv. 807, 813-14 (1959); Schatzki, The Employer's Unilateral Act-A
Per Se Violation-Sometimes, 44 Taxas L. REv. 470 (1966); 57 VA. L. REv. 706 (1971).
83. Commentators reviewing this area frequently have taken one of twvo extreme
positions. Compare Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, 63 HARv. L. REv. 389, 404 (1950), and Weyand, Majority
Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 CoLUmi. L. Rxv. 556, 579-80 (1945) (all unilateral
changes constitute refusals to bargain), qwtb Note, Unilateral Action as a Legitimate
Econonic Weapon, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 666 (1962) (unilateral actions are consistent with
the Act and thus are never refusals to bargain).
84. 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
85. NLRB v. WRooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). See notes
12-23 supra & accompanying text.
1974]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:918
section 8(a) (5) of the Act. 86 There are, however, three generally
recognized exceptions to the per se rule of Katz. Thus, where the
employer and union have bargained to impasse over a change,87 where
the union has waived its right to insist on bargaining over a change,88
or where the change is required by law to be made upon the termination
of the contract,89 the employer commits no violation by acting without
first reaching agreement with the union. All three exceptions are
premised upon the assumption that, since the rule prohibiting unilateral
action is designed to assist collective bargaining, it ceases to be applicable
where bargaining fails, despite good faith efforts, or where the employer
has relied in good faith upon the conduct of the union or upon statutory
requirements.
Under the rule of Katz unless one of the exceptions is specifically
applicable, unilateral action with respect to a subject within the scope
of the statutory phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment" is a per se violation of section 8(a) (5) because it
"directly obstructs or inhibits the actual process of discussion .... " 0
It is clear that the decisions of the Board and courts regarding which
86. Katz involved an employer's unilateral implementation of a new sick leave plan
for its employees, an increase in wages substantially higher than had been offered the
union at the collective bargaining table, and a grant of merit increases.
87. Impasse is probably the most common exception to the per se rule. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1963) (the question of impasse relates
to the totality of the bargaining situation rather than to the specific item upon which
the employer took action); Marine & Shipbuilding Workers Union v. NLRB, 320
F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 984 (1964) (impasse held not to be an
exception when it resulted from the employer's insistence upon a nonmandatory sub-
ject); R.C. Can Co, 144 N.L.R.B. 210 (1963); Comfort Springs Corp., 143 N.L.R.B.
906 (1963); Stackhouse Oldsmobile, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 1239 (1963). See gencrally
Collins, Unilateral Changes in Terms and Conditions of Employment at Contract
Termination, 17 N.Y.U. CoNp. LAB. 149 (1964).
88. The waiver may take the form of either an express assent to the change in
question or agreement to the inclusion in the contract of a management-rights clause
covering the change. Such a waiver, however, will be strictly construed by the
Board and courts and will not be effectuated absent a clear showing of the union's
intent to waive its bargaining rights. See, e.g., Lloyd F. Richardson, Sr., 109 N.L.R.B.
136 (1954); Frohman Mfg. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1308 (1954).
89. The primary changes which may be made under this exception are the termina-
tion of union security or checkoff of union dues under an irrevocable wage assignment.
Unless a dues checkoff is terminated upon expiration of the contract, there would
be a violation of section 302 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186
(1970). See Marine & Shipbuilding Workers Union v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615, 620 n.4
(3d Cir. 1963).
90. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962).
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subjects are mandatory in the context of contract negotiations9' have
the corollary effect of imposing restraints upon management's freedom
to initiate unilateral changes for the benefit of its business. Consequently,
the most fertile source of litigation in this area has been the issue of
management's right to act unilaterally with respect to subjects which go
to the heart of the operation of the company-subjects such as sub-
contracting, partial closings, and the sale of a portion of the business. 2
The rule originally applied by the Board to employer decisions to
subcontract work was that, absent a showing of anti-union animus, the
employer was free to make economically motivated decisions unilater-
ally.93 A change in the Board's attitude toward unilateral action was
signaled, however, in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.9 4 in which
the Board found a violation of section 8(a) (5) in the employer's de-
cision to subcontract work normally performed by members of the
bargaining unit, notwithstanding that the decision was prompted by
economic reasons. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision,95
even though there had been no showing of an anti-union motive for the
91. See notes 24-81 supra & accompanying text.
92. For a more detailed examination of this question, see Goetz, The Duty to Bargain
About Changes in Operations, 1964 DUKE L.J. 1; Platt, The Duty to Bargain as Applied
to Management Decisions, 19 LAB. L.J. 143 (1968); Wortman, Management Rights
and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 16 LAB. L.J. 195 (1965); Comment, Employer's
Duty to Bargain About Subcontracting and Other "Management" Decisions, 64 CoLum.
L. REv. 294 (1964); Note, Labor Law Problems in Plant Relocation, 77 HARv. L. REv.
1100 (1964).
93. See Comment, Employer's Duty to Bargain About Subcontracting and Other
"Management" Decisions, 64 CoLum. L. REV. 294 (1964).
94. 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), aff'd, 379 U.S.
203 (1964). See Farmer, Good Faith Bargaining Over Subcontracting, 51 GEo. L.J.
558 (1963); Nelson, Through a Looking Glass Darkly: Fibreboard Five Years Later,
21 LAB. L.J. 755 (1970); Rabin, The Decline and Fall of Fibreboard, 24 N.Y.U. CoNoF.
LAB. 237 (1971); Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination of Bargaining Unit Work:
The Search for Standards in Defining the Scope of the Duty to Bargain, 71 CoLum.
L. REV. 803 (1971); Smith, Subcontracting and Union-Management Legal and Contractual
Relations, 17 IRX. REs. L. REV. 1272 (1966); Comment, Employer's Duty to Bargain About
Subcontracting and Other "Managenent" Decisions, 64 CoLuas. L. REv. 294 (1964); Com-
ment, Subcontracting, Mandatory Collective Bargaining, and the 1965 NLRB Decisions,
18 STA,. L. REv. 256 (1965); Comment, The Development of the Fibreboard Doctrine:
The Duty to Bargain Over Economically Motivated Subcontracting Decisions, 33 U. CmI.
L. REv. 315 (1966); Comment, The Scope of Collective Bargaining, 74 YALE L.J. 1472
(1965).
95. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). For an earlier
case involving the application of the Railway Labor Act, see Order of R.R. Telegraphers
v. Chicago & N.1,W.R.R., 362 U.S. 330 (1960) (elimination of bargaining unit jobs was
mandatory bargaining subject). In Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
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employer's decision. While the Court limited its holding to the facts
of the case,96 the Board has continued to apply the "rule" of Fibreboard
to numerous subcontracting cases,97 requiring bargaining over the basic
decision as well as the "effects" of the action."
Moreover, the Board has extended the Fibreboard doctrine to require
bargaining in virtually all cases in which management decisions have
brought about the discharge of bargaining unit employees." Accordingly,
decisions to change or discontinue shifts,' to transfer an operation to
a different location,101 to close part of a business,0 2 to transfer work
to another plant, 03 and to automate 14 have been denominated mandatory
men, 302 F.2d 540 (7th Cit. 1962), the meaning of the statutory phrase "terms and condi-
tions of employment" was held to be identical under the Railway Labor Act and the
National Labor Relations Act.
96. The Court stated:
We are thus not expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining to hold,
as we do now, that the type of "contracting out" involved in this case-the
replacement of employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an
independent contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of
employment-is a statutory subject of collective bargaining under § 8(d).
Our decision need not and does not encompass other forms of "contracting
out" or "subcontracting" which arise daily in our complex economy.
379 U.S. at 215.
97. For some recent Board decisions on the subcontracting issue, see Howmet Corp,
197 N.L.R.B. No. 91 (1972); Don Mendenhall, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1109 (1972). For
decisions involving the Board's remedial power when an employer illegally subcontracts
work, see NLRB v. Jackson Farmers, Inc., 457 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1972); Hijos de
Ricardo Vela, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 43 (1972); Hospice of Alverne, 195 N.L.R.B. 313
(1972); Tellepsen Petro-Chem. Constructors, 190 N.L.R.B. 433 (1971).
98. It is well settled that the effects of management decisions upon employees are
mandatory subjects of bargaining. See NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361 F.2d
512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing
Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965); Red Cross Drug Co., 174 N.L.R.B. 85 (1969); Ozark
Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966).
99. New York Mirror, 151 N.L.R.B. 834 (1965).
100. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 737 (1969); Dixie Ohio Express Co.,
167 N.L.R.B. 573 (1967), rev'd, 409 F.2d 10 (6th Cir. 1969); Assonet Trucking Co,
156 N.L.R.B. 350 (1965).
101. Thompson Transp. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 746 (1967), rer'd, 406 F.2d 698 (10th
Cir. 1969); Transmarine Navigation Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. 998 (1965), rev'd, 380 F.2d
933 (9th Cir. 1967).
102. Red Cross Drug Co., 174 N.L.R.B. 85 (1969); Drapery Mfg. Co., 170 N.L.R.B.
1706 (1968), reed, 425 F.2d 1026 (8th Cit. 1970); Schnell Tool & Die Corp., 162
N.L.R.B. 313 (1967), aff'd, 403 F.2d 1021 (6th Cir. 1968).
103. Senco, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 882 (1969); Weltronic Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 235 (1968),
enforced, 419 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1969).
104. Northwestern Publishing Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1069 (1963), aff'd, 343 F.2d 521
(7th Cir. 1965); Renton News Record, 136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962).
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bargaining subjects. A division of authority between the Board and the
courts of appeals, however, has resulted from the application of two ir-
reconcilable tests to determine an employer's obligation to bargain over
an economic decision to terminate or to relocate its operations. Al-
though the Board has employed a "loss of bargaining unit jobs" test in
holding that any management decision which may result in the loss of
employment is a mandatory bargaining subject, 05 the courts have ap-
plied a "basic change test," maintaining that an employer's decision
involving a basic change in operations is a permissive subject, over
which there is no duty to bargain. 10 6 In two recent decisions, however,
the Board appears to have moved toward acceptance of the courts' po-
sition.10 7
In General Motors Corp.08 the Board was confronted with an em-
ployer's decision to sell one of its plants. For the first time the Board
turned to the courts for authority, rather than to its own Fibreboard
progeny, in holding that the employer's decision to sell part of its en-
terprise was a permissive bargaining subject. Indeed, the Board appears
to have taken an even more restrictive position than that of the courts,
since in General Motors there was neither a showing of economic ne-
cessity in the decision to sell the franchise0 9 nor consideration of whether
105. Dixie Ohio Express Co, 167 N.L.R.B. 573 (1967); Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161
N.L.R.B. 561 (1966); Transmarine Navigation Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. 998 (1965); Royal
Plating & Polishing Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 619 (1965); Burns Int'l Detective Agency, 148
N.L.R.B. 1267 (1964); Adams Dairy, Inc., 137 N..R.B. 815 (1962); Town & Country
Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962).
106. NLRB v. Dixie Ohio Express Co., 409 F.2d 10 (6th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Royal
Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350
F.2d 108 (8th Cit. 1965); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, 346 F.2d 897 (8th
Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cit. 1961); Jay Foods, Inc.
v. NLRB, 292 F.2d 317 (7th Cit. 1961). See also Comment, Duty to Bargain on a
Decision to Terninate or Relocate Operations, 25 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 96 (1968).
107. The change in the Board's position may reflect its change in composition, a
majority of the members now having been appointed by President Nixon. It should be
noted that the major expansion of the mandatory bargaining subject category occurred
primarily during the period of the Kennedy-Johnson Board. See K. McGuzNsss, Tim
NEw FRONTMER NLRB 127 (1963).
108. 191 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971). See generally 1971-72 Annual Survey of Labor Relations
Law, 13 B.C. INlD. & Cox. L. REv. 1347, 1408-13 (1972); 23 SYRACUSE L. Rnv. 170 (1972);
1972 Wisc. L. Rxv. 291.
109. See Platt, The Duty to Bargain as Applied to Management Decisions, 19 LAB. L.J.
143 (1968) (emphasizing that Fibreboard deals only with decisions which are eco-
nomically motivated).
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the sale constituted a "partial closing" of the employer's multi-dealer
operation." 0
Summit Tooling Co."' represents a still more drastic departure from
the Board's former position. Although the case involved a partial
closing of the business clearly motivated by and-union animus, the
Board held that the employer had no duty to bargain over the decision
with the union representing Summit's employees."2 This ruling is direct-
ly contrary to the Board's position in Ozark Trailers, Inc.,"3 in which it
was held that a decision partially to close an operation was a mandatory
bargaining subject, even when the decision was motivated by economic
considerations.
It is submitted that the decisions of the Board in General Motors
Corp. and Summit Tooling, together with the Supreme Court decision
in Pittsburgh Plate Glas n 4 may well represent a retreat from the trend
toward the reclassification of most bargaining subjects as mandatory.
Although many complex and difficult topics remain for evaluation by
the Board and courts,"5 the indications of a shift away from the Board's
previous policy of intervention in the area of collective bargaining sub-
jects is indeed most welcome.
110. One commentator has viewed the General Motors decision as "a situation where
mandatory bargaining would have imposed no burden on the employer and where
agreement may have been possible." The commentary continues:
[Tihe Board appears to have adopted the analysis of the circuit courts, at
least with respect to those cases involving a capital commitment. This
could exclude any critical evaluation of individual factual situations. If the
Board continues to follow the reasoning of the circuit courts, it is con-
ceivable that mandatory bargaining of managerial decisions will only be
required in certain subcontracting situations and situations not involving
capital commitment. Thus, decisions to close, to transfer to another location,
to sell, and possibly even to automate, would no longer be subjects for
mandatory bargaining.
1972 Wisc. L. REv. 291, 299.
111. 195 NL.RB. 479 (1972). See generally 1971-72 Annual Survey of Labor Re-
lations Law, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rzv. 1347, 1408 (1972).
112. Although the decision in Summit Tooling retained the obligation of manage-
ment to bargain about the effects of a unilateral change, Member Fanning, in his
dissent in General Motors Corp., argued that bargaining prior to the time a decision
becomes finalized may be necessary to prevent the foreclosure of bargaining over a
number of valid effects. 191 N.LR.B. at 954. Such a foreclosure, it was claimed, would
result from the employer presenting the union with a fait accompli.
113. 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966).
114. 404 U.S. 157 (1971). See notes 43-45 supra & accompanying text.
115. In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 473 F.2d 549
(1st Cir. 1972), a decision which could have far-reaching implications, it was held that
BARGAINING DICHOTOMY
DEFICIENCIES IN THE BORG-WARNER DICHOTOMY
When Congress added section 8 (d) to the NLRA to mandate col-
lective bargaining over "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment," it was in an attempt to clarify the extent of the duty to
bargain."" The result, however, of the case-by-case, issue-by-issue
approach of the Board and courts to interpretation of the statutory
phrase has been a tremendous volume of litigation with an absence of
any real certainty. The apparent recent change in the Board's attitude
toward expanding the mandatory classification provides an excellent op-
portunity for a reevaluation of the direction it and the courts have
taken for so many years. Before a more advantageous alternative may
be suggested, however, it is necessary to isolate the most troublesome
shortcomings of the mandatory-permissive dichotomy as it is currently
applied.
The dichotomy discourages the introduction of newz bargaining subjects.
Presently, a party attempting to introduce a subject not previously
classified as mandatory or permissive, and not clearly within the statu-
tory phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment," will most assuredly be met by a refusal of the other party to
negotiate. The Borg-Warner treatment of permissive subjects, pre-
cluding one party from insisting upon their inclusion in the contract
while permitting the other to refuse adamantly to bargain over them,
serves effectively to preserve the status quo by postponing the fruition
of new subjects, regardless of their timeliness or importance.ll
Obvious examples of potential bargaining subjects may be found in
the area of environmental concern. 11 Because air and water quality
are matters of universal concern, the judicial response to questions of
environmental quality is being subjected to scrutiny.11 While the
there was no requirement that the employer bargain about either the decision to merge
the company with another or the effects of the contemplated merger on the conditions
of employment. Although the case arose under the Railway Labor Act, the court
employed an analysis of cases decided under the National Labor Relations Act.
116. See note 7 supra & accompanying text.
117. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 358-59 (1958)
(Harlan, Clark & Whittaker, JJ., dissenting in part).
118. See generally Oldham, Organized Labor, The Environment, and the Taft-Hartley
Act, 71 Micur. L. REv. 935 (1973).
119. See generally Oakes, Developments in Enviromnental Law, 3 E.L.R. 50001 (1973);
Kiechel, Environmental Court Vel Non, 3 E.L.R. 50013 (1973); Whitney, The Case for
Creating a Special Environmental Court System, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 473 (1973);
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population at large is becoming increasingly involved in this issue, the
individuals perhaps most directly affected are denied an efficient mecha-
nism for obtaining redress of their grievances. Since the employee
working for a corporation which is the source of pollution has a vital
interest in the abatement of this condition, it is submitted that such issues
as the willingness and ability of the employer to provide efficient en-
vironmental protection and the extent to which the union should share
in the cost of that protection should not be excluded from the bargain-
ing table120 as a result of an arbitrary and basically inflexible rule regard-
ing "approved" subjects.
Nevertheless, environmental issues do not appear to fall within the
statutory phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment." Although it might be argued that environmental quality is
a "condition of employment," absent a Board or court determination
to that effect the party which introduces these subjects into negoti-
ation runs a substantial risk of violating the Borg-Warner rule and
committing a section 8(a) (5) or section 8(b) (3) unfair labor practice,
a risk which few negotiators would be willing to assume. There have
been numerous cases in which a party, in complete good faith, intro-
duced a subject into collective bargaining negotiations, pursued it with
all available tactics, insisted upon it to the point of impasse, and then
was held to have committed an unfair labor practice because the Board
viewed the subject as permissive.'2 ' Obviously, at this last stage it is
too late to modify the position and correct the good faith error in
judgment. That most parties will refrain entirely from introducing
new subjects at the bargaining table in order to avoid incurring unfair
labor practice charges results in freezing the subjects available for negoti-
ations and a maintenance of the status quo.
Whitney, The Case for Creating a Special Environmental Court System-A Further
Comment, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 33 (1973).
120. See Oldham, supra note 118, at 981 n.173, where the author suggests that environ-
mental problems should not be limited to the bargaining table, but rather that nego-
tiations should constitute only one element in the "arsenal of weapons" available to
employees. The author analogizes refusals to perform environmentally injurious work
to cases involving refusals to work based upon a conflict between job requirements
and the employee's religious belief. See, e.g., International Shoe Co., 17 L.R.R.M. 2813
(1946) (Klamon, Arbitrator); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 17 L.R.R.M. 2722 (1945)
(McCloy, Arbitrator); A.O. Smith Corp., 72-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 8134 (Volz,
Arbitrator).
121. E.g., NLRB v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952); NLRB v.
Andrew Jergens Co., 175 F.2d 130 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 827 (1949); Inland




The Borg-Warner dichotomy may also be used affirmatively as a
bargaining weapon. A party wishing to avoid bargaining about a sub-
ject may merely assert the permissive nature of the issue and refuse
even to discuss it. This position is extremely effective in view of the
dificulties it presents to the party attempting to introduce the subject.
If the subject is indeed permissive, insistence may result in a violation of
the Act; if the subject is mandatory and its proponent hesitates to pur-
sue it, the opportunity may be lost to implement a new contract clause
of potential benefit. The party employing the dichotomy as a bar-
gaining weapon, however, may equivocate about a subject to which he
is opposed, while avoiding the burden of justifying his position on the
subject. Thus, even if the position that the subject is permissive is
eventually proven incorrect, the party opposing its introduction has
accomplished a substantial and profitable delay which could only vitiate
the other party's bargaining power.122
Employment of the sharp division between mandatory and per-
missive subjects has the natural effect of preventing the introduction
into negotiations of previously unclassified subjects, not only in the
area of labor relations but also with respect to important questions of
economics, sociology, and related fields. To remedy this situation, it
is imperative that a general rule be developed which is sufficiently
definite to enable the parties to anticipate the status of potential bar-
gaining subjects prior to the commencement of negotiations.
The application of the dichotomy to unilateral action has resulted in an
imbalance of bargaining power.
It has already been indicated that, by applying the Borg-Warner
dichotomy to basic changes in company operations unilaterally insti-
tuted by management, the Board and courts have placed restrictions
upon the employer's right to manage which the union was unable to
122. Of course, if the subject is eventually determined to be mandatory, the party
resisting its introduction into negotiations will be guilty of a refusal to bargain under
section 8(a) (5) or 8(b) (3). Nevertheless, the advantages of delay may be sufficient
to outweigh the disadvantages of an unfair labor practice penalty. A delay is im-
portant in its effect, not only upon the negotiators, but especially upon the organiza-
tion which they represent. For example, a delay of several months in the determination
whether a subject is proper for bargaining will, in most cases, vitiate rank-and-file
support for it. This is especially true if the economic climate is altered during the
period of delay. The recent negotiations between Chrysler and the United Automobile
Workers illustrate this point. The major topic of bargaining in 1973 was the issue of.
voluntary overtime. Immediately after the union secured major concessions in this
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obtain at the bargaining table.123 It should also be noted that the em-
ployer's duty to bargain over changes in existing operations extends
beyond the term of the contract and into the period of negotiations
for a new contract. The application of the dichotomy to unilateral
action thus has the secondary effect of limiting the employer's options
with respect to the actions it may take in support of its bargaining posi-
tion during negotiation of a new contract.
The unreasonableness of this result may be demonstrated by an
examination of the cases dealing with the unilateral withdrawal of
fringe benefits. In Molders Union Local 155 v. NLRB, 24 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found a section 8(a) (5)
violation in an employer's unilateral withdrawal of fringe benefits dur-
ing contract negotiations. The court reasoned that since the employer's
conduct was calculated to produce a strike, it interfered with the
union's right to decide whether to strike and thus was inherently
destructive of union interests.1 25 This result is difficult to reconcile
with the Supreme Court's determination in American Ship Building
Co. v. NLRB 26 that an employer's action in "locking-out" 127 its
employees may be justified as a legitimate method of exerting bargaining
pressure and is not inherently destructive of union interests.
It seems unreasonable to assert that conduct such as that in Molders
Union, which deprives employees only of certain fringe benefits, is more
harmful to employee and union interests than a lockout, which deprives
employees of all salary and benefits. From the union's perspective, the
area, the Arab oil embargo was imposed, causing the layoff of tens of thousands of
autoworkers. Clearly, if a delay had been secured on the voluntary overtime issue
until the embargo was imposed, the results of the negotiations would have been
markedly altered. It is inconceivable that the rank and file would have supported a
demand for voluntary overtime during a period when they were in danger of losing
their jobs.
123. See notes 82-115 supra & accompanying text.
124. 442 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
125. For a discussion of the implications of employer actions held to be "inherently
destructive" of union interests, see NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 US. 26
(1967).
126. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
127. A "lockout" to an employer is the equivalent of a strike to a union; it occurs
when the company closes its doors and refuses to allow its employees to work. Al-
though the result of either strike or lockout is the same (the company is denied
production and the employees are denied employment and wages), the advantage of a
lockout to an employer is that he is able to determine the timing of the shutdown;
and will normally choose a time when the economic injury to his business may be
minimized. For a more detailed discussion of the lockout as a bargaining weapon,
see 76 HARv. L. REv. 1494 (1963); 111 U. PA. L. REv. 128 (1962).
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employer's unilateral withdrawal of certain fringe benefits would lead
only to a possible "loss of face" with its members and a slight weak-
ening of its bargaining position, while a complete lockout would result
in the closing of the employer's business at a time most convenient for
it. Moreover, in a lockout union members are completely out of
work, receiving no income, and contributing no dues to support the
union. Concededly, both actions are designed to enable the employer
to improve its position at the bargaining table; nevertheless, to contend
that the employer's most severe weapon is less inherently dangerous
to union and employee interests is illogical in the extreme.
Moreover, such a position makes the parties' relative bargaining
strengths dependent not upon economic power or bargaining tactics but
rather upon the options the Board and courts have seen fit to leave in
the hands of the adverse parties. Unable to take any partial measures
to improve its bargaining position, the employer must choose between
complete inaction or a total halt to all forms of production. The union,
however, is not confronted with a similar "all or nothing" dilemma.
In NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union 2 s the Supreme Court held that
a slowdown employed as an economic weapon to aid the accomplish-
ment of the union's demands at the collective-bargaining table was not
in violation of the duty to bargain. Observing that "the use of economic
pressure... is of itself not at all inconsistent with the duty of bargain-
ing in good faith," 129 the Court distinguished the unilateral alteration
of employment conditions by the union from unilateral action by an
employer on the ground that the changes instituted by the union were
not designed to be permanent. 30 Such an argument, it is submitted, is
tenuous at best, since there is no basis for assuming that changes in em-
ployment conditions unilaterally imposed by an employer are any more
permanent than those imposed by a union.
That the current state of the law regarding unilateral action is in-
consistent is even more evident in light of the court's reasoning in
Molders Union that the employer's conduct was "inherently destruc-
tive" because it was intended to induce a strike.131 From this position
it would follow that all employer conduct which induces a strike is
128. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
129. Id. at 490-91.
130. The Court stated: "There was no indication that the practices that the union
was engaging in were designed to be permanent conditions of work. They were
rather means to another end.' Id. at 496-97 n.28. See also NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S.
736,747 (1962).
131. 442 F.2d at 746.
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inherently destructive of union interests. But such a conclusion is un-
tenable, for an employer coud conceivably induce a strike by adhering
to a particular bargaining position or by indicating that it is stock-
piling supplies in anticipation of a work stoppage. Although both of
these are legitimate employer tactics, their effects would be indistin-
guishable from those of a unilateral withdrawal of fringe benefits.
By limiting the options available to an employer acting in support
of its bargaining position, the application of the Borg-Warner dich-
otomy to unilateral action appears to be inconsistent with the national
policy of resting the results of collective bargaining upon the economic
132 sustrength of the parties. It is submitted that the Board should, if not
eliminate the restrictions on unilateral action, at least review the appli-
cation of the "inherently destructive" theory. Some attempt must be
made to distinguish between employer actions which are merely tactics
designed to improve its bargaining position and those which constitute
direct attacks upon the basis of employee representation and which
threaten the very existence of the union.
The dichotomy is too inflexible to adapt to variations among industries.
By requiring a general classification of bargaining subjects as either
mandatory or permissive, the Borg-Warner dichotomy fails to take
into account the often substantial differences among industries in the
American economy.'3' These differences are particularly relevant to
a determination of a subject's classification, for what may well be a
mandatory subject in one industrial setting should be viewed as permis-
sive in another. For example, a management decision to purchase pre-
fabricated materials may be expected to engender a markedly different
response in the construction industry than it would in the trucldng
industry,134 while a decision involving company housing would have
a much different effect in a small southern textile town or an Appalach-
ian coal-mining area than it would in the aerospace industry. Similarly,
132. It is generally recognized that the National Labor Relations Act was not
intended to give one party a bargaining advantage over another. Senator Wagner, the
sponsor of the original NLRA, stated that the "primary requirement for cooperation is
that employers and employees should possess equality of bargaining power." 78
CoNG. Rac. 3678, 3679 (1934) (emphasis supplied).
133. St. Antoine, Judicial Caution and the Supreme Court's Labor Decisions, October
Term, 1971, ABA SEcrIoN oF LABoR RELATIONS LAW-1972 PROCEMMINGS 4, 14 (1973).
134. See Smith, Boycotts of Prefabricated Building Products and the Regulation of
Technological Change on Construction Jobsites, 25 IND. & LAB. REL. Rrv. 186 (1972);




the use of a union label 3" could be viewed as a mandatory subject in
the garment and printing industries but merely a permissive matter
in the automobile industry.
Thus, although the trend of the dichotomy is toward a uniform rule
of law concerning each bargaining subject, the practices of different
industries clearly suggest that markedly different treatment is required.
Any attempt to apply a classification of mandatory and permissive sub-
jects therefore should contain a built-in flexibility to accommodate
the various characteristics of substantially different industries. The
current dichotomy does not.
The dichotomy has no sound basis in the reality of collective bargaining.
The process of collective bargaining is an extremely complex pro-
cedure requiring a great deal of knowledge, patience, and skill on the
part of the participants."" In many instances, the subjects which are
not raised at the bargaining table, the manner in which others are raised,
and the contexts outside the bargaining room in which discussion occurs
are more important than events at the table.3 7 Numerous tactics are
available to a party who wishes to advance a permissive subject, to
impasse if necessary, without providing sufficient evidence to warrant
a finding of a section 8(a) (5) or 8(b) (3) unfair labor practice. A few
examples should serve to illuminate this point. 38
A party desiring to include a permissive subject in negotiations could,
135. See generally Bird and Robinson, The Effectiveness of the Union Label and
"Buy Union" Campaigns, 25 IND. & LAB. Rr. R v. 512 (1972).
136. The complexity of collective bargaining negotiations can perhaps be best il-
lustrated by consideration of various types of negotiations often being conducted
simultaneously. Professors Walton and McKensie employ the following divisions:
(I) distributive bargaining-the type of negotiations familiar to the public, where the
parties "haggle" over who is to receive how much, and where one party's gain is the
other party's loss; (2) integrative bargaining-the negotiation of an issue on which
both parties may gain or both parties may lose (examples are a job-evaluation system
or a retraining program); (3) attitudinal structuring-the shaping of such attitudes as
trust or distrust, friendliness or hostility, between the parties (this is especially im-
portant since the parties will often have to deal with each other over an extended
period of time); and (4) intraorganizational bargaining-the maneuvering to achieve
consensus within (rather than between) the labor and management organizations. A
BwAsvioRl. THEORY oir LABOR NEG OTIATION S (R. Walton & R. McKensie eds. 1965)
[hereinafter cited as Walton & McKensiel. See also W. MmRNYK, THE EcoNoMcs
OF LABOR AN) COLLECIVE BARGmAImNG 392-407 (2d ed. 1973).
137. See Walton & McKensie, supra note 136, at 103-11.
138. For other examples of methods for raising nonmandatory subjects, see Cox,
Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L. REv.
1057, 1076-77 (1958).
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for instance, refrain entirely from raising the topic at the bargaining
table, while making various comments to "outside" sources through press
conferences, union meetings, and internal newsletters and publications
regarding the importance that party attaches to the satisfactory settle-
ment of the permissive issue. In this manner the opposing party will be
informed of the position and be aware of the probability that no final
agreement is possible without some concessions on its part regarding that
issue.139 Similarly, a negotiator could raise a permissive subject at the
bargaining table, proceed to admit that it is not a mandatory subject and
that bargaining is not required, but in the process subtly convey the
impression that the union members (or higher management officials)
attach a great deal of importance to the issue. 40 Furthermore, the
negotiator could bargain "tough" on one or more of the many impor-
tant mandatory issues while clearly indicating that if the permissive
subject were conceded he would be more flexible or make corresponding
concessions in other areas. Finally, it would be possible to create an
artificial deadlock and impasse involving a mandatory subject in order
to gain a desired concession with respect to a permissive topic. A prime
example would be a strike by a union for the ostensible purpose of
securing a larger wage increase, while in reality the union is prepared
to accept the employer's final wage offer in exchange for a clause dealing
with a permissive subject.'
It is of great importance to note that implementation of any of these
techniques could have a deleterious effect on negotiations. Such tactics
place a premium upon subterfuge. Since the exact words employed
may have a major impact upon a subsequent unfair labor practice pro-
ceeding, the negotiators may be distracted from concentrating on the
business of reaching an agreement. Moreover, there eventually arises
139. An example of this strategy is the procedure employed by Walter Reuther,
President of the United Auto Workers, in the early 1950's. To impress the auto
manufacturers with his determination to secure a guaranteed annual wage, Mr. Reuther
employed the press to demonstrate to the companies, the rank and file workers, the
other AFL-CIO unions, and the public at large that he was staking his reputation and
probably his career on securing an agreement on this issue. Walton & McKensie,
supra note 136, at 104. Thus, when a labor negotiator publicly discusses bargaining
subjects it generally is with the intent to have a major impact on the conduct of
negotiations.
140. Walton & MeKensie, supra note 136, at 99.
141. Professor Cox employs the following example: "During the years in which the
Massachusetts court held it unlawful to strike for a union shop, there were not
many strikes upon that issue but a very considerable number of strikes for higher
wages were settled as soon as the employer decided to grant a union shop agreement"
Cox, supra note 138, at 1077 n.64.
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an occasion during negotiations when each party must know exactly
the other party's strengths and attitudes on the major unresolved issues,
or a strike may well result. 4 2 Nevertheless, the present use of the
dichotomy requires a party that is prepared to insist upon a permissive
subject to employ all available tactics to conceal its true position.
Thus, the mandatory-permissive dichotomy ignores the reality of the
collective bargaining process, since efficient negotiators can succeed
in forcing an adversary to bargain over permissive subjects, albeit
illegally. Clearly, there should be available a method by which new
and important subjects may be openly introduced, without the neces-
sity for concealing the parties' true positions and incurring the risk of
unwanted and undesirable strikes.
PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE DICHOTOMY
From the foregoing analysis of the current application of the man-
datory-permissive dichotomy, it is apparent that a revised standard is
required to eliminate the uncertainty and inequities of the present
system. Such a standard not only is a prerequisite for proper determi-
nations by the Board and the courts but is necessary as a guide for the
parties themselves. Without such guidance neither labor nor manage-
ment is in a position to evaluate effectively the legal status of a proposed
bargaining subject and, therefore, to frame a response which is both
appropriate to the actions of the other party and consistent with law.
It is submitted that if such a standard were available to the parties
prior to the commencement of negotiations, the amount of litigation
involving sections 8(a) (5) and 8(b) (3) would be substantially re-
duced.
This Note has suggested that the trend toward classifying an increas-
ing number of bargaining subjects as mandatory must be reevaluated
and, if possible, reversed. At least one commentator has proposed,
however, that if the trend is to continue it would be preferable imme-
diately to classify all subjects as mandatory,143 so that neither party
could refuse to bargain about any subject which is introduced into
collective bargaining negotiations and either party could insist upon
any subject to the point of impasse. This position is premised upon the
assumption that a trend toward reclassifying an increasing number of
subjects as mandatory eventually would result in all subjects not illegal
142. See generally Valton & McKensie, supra note 136, at 61-67.
143. St. Antoine, Judicial Caution and the Supreme Court's Labor Decisions, October
Term, 1971, ABA SECnoN OF LABOR RELATIONS LAw-1972 PRocErnNis, 4, 11-15 (1973).
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being so categorized. If this is indeed to be the case, it is argued, then
it would be preferable to reach that point as quickly as possible to avoid
the long period of confusion which would precede it.
4
Concededly, this proposal would have the advantage of removing all
controversy over the status of a proposed bargaining subject and would
serve to clarify the area of unilateral action. It is submitted, however,
that the suggested approach is highly understandable for several reasons.
In light of recent decisions involving the current dichotomy, 4 ' the
basic assumption that the trend will continue unabated appears to be
unwarranted. Morever, if all bargaining subjects were mandatory, the
parties would have to discuss every topic raised, since a failure to nego-
tiate in good faith concerning any conceivable topic, regardless of how
trivial, would constitute an unfair labor practice under section 8 (a) (5)
or 8(b) (3). Finally, the application of this proposal to the area of
unilateral action would result in the total destruction of any manage-
ment flexibility, for conceivably every change a company desired to
implement unilaterally would be prohibited. Thus, although preferable
to a gradual reclassification of all subjects as mandatory, the proposal
to accelerate the reclassification process poses a real threat to free
collective bargaining. Were all subjects classified as mandatory, any
benefits derived in terms of certainty would be offset by a loss of the
flexibility which is so vital to both parties in labor-management relations.
It is submitted that a far more desirable approach would be to retain
the mandatory-permissive dichotomy while altering the Borg-Warner
rule so that only refusals to bargain over mandatory subjects would
violate sections 8 (a) (5) and 8 (b) (3). This proposal would continue to
impose upon the parties a duty to bargain over those matters which are
most basic to labor relations, while permitting the introduction of,
and insistence upon, permissive subjects. Since a party could continue
to refuse to bargain about a permissive topic, the determinative factor
as to which party is successful would be the relative economic power
of each. Such an approach would also have the secondary effect of
checking expansion of the category of mandatory subjects, since it
would no longer be necessary for a party to resort to extensive liti-
gation to have a new subject classified as mandatory before it could
be introduced into bargaining negotiations.
In addition, the contract should constitute the sole limitation upon
a party's freedom to act. Such an approach would remove the uncer-
144. Id.
145. See notes 107-15 supra & accompanying text.
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tainty that currently exists in the area of unilateral action and serve to
bring the parties back into a more equitable balance of power. Since
the employer would be limited in its right to take unilateral action
only to the extent that it has made concessions to the union at the
bargaining table, the union would not possess substantial economic power
which it was unable to obtain through its negotiating skill. There
would also exist a greater degree of certainty concerning the legality
of any unilateral action either of the parties might be contemplating.
Although this approach may engender new problems of contract inter-
pretation, it is submitted that this disadvantage would be less trouble-
some than the confusion over the meaning of section 8 (d), the unjust




Although the mandatory-permissive dichotomy established in Borg-
Warver has, since its inception, been subjected to heavy criticism, 4 7
recent decisions of the Board 14 8 and the Supreme Court 4 apparently
slowing expansion of the category of mandatory subjects present an
excellent opportunity for serious consideration of alternatives to the
Borg-Warner rule. The traditional dichotomy has hindered the intro-
duction of unclassified subjects into negotiations, failed to distinguish
the treatment of two basically different areas of labor relations, and
resulted in a loss of touch with the reality of collective bargaining.
Perhaps the most serious defect of the dichotomy is the opportunity it
presents for judicial intervention into the collective bargaining process.
Although the public interest in labor relations is undeniably vital, it
clearly was not the intention of the authors of the federal labor legis-
146. During the period between the commencement of a union campaign to gain
recognition as the bargaining representative of the employees and the completion of
the first collective bargaining agreement between the parties, the Board could prohibit
unilateral action by either party. For a discussion of unilateral action during union
election campaigns, see R. Wn ums, P. JANus & K. HuNN, NLRB REGVLATION OF
ELECTION CoNiUCT 104-36 (1974).
147. See, e.g., Christensen, New Subjects and New Concepts in Collective Bar-
gaining, ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW--1970 PROcEEDINGS 245-252 (1971);
Cox, The Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, ABA
SECTIoN or LAOR RELATIONS LAw-1958 PROCEDINGS, 12, 30-40 (1959).
148. Summit Tooling Co., 195 NL.R.B. 479 (1972); General Motors Corp., 191
N.L.R.B. 951 (1971). See notes 107-13 supra & accompanying text.
149. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 US. 157
(1971). See notes 43-45 supra & accompanying text.
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lation to permit the Board and courts to dictate the terms of collective
agreements. In his remarks to the Senate in support of the Wagner
Act, Senator Walsh stated: "The bill indicates the method and manner
in which employees may organize, the method and manner of selecting
their representatives or spokesmen, and leads them to the office door of
their employer with the legal authority to negotiate for their fellow
employees. The bill does not go beyond the office door." 11o Senator
Walsh's famous door was breached long ago by the NLRB and the
federal judiciary, who now occupy a space next to the table looking
over the negotiator's shoulder. The issue which remains to be deter-
mined is whether the Board and courts should be permitted to sit at
the table and negotiate agreements for the parties. It is submitted that
the time has arrived, if not to remove them from the room, at least to
point them in the direction of the door.
150. 79 CON(. RMc 7659 (1935) (emphasis supplied).
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